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In order to study the expectation formation of financial institutions in the foreign 
exchange market we develop and apply a recursive selection and estimation 
algorithm to a dataset of surveyed foreign exchange market expectations. 
Responses are classified into two groups and forecasting models are endogenously 
determined within the groups. Estimation results reveal that a fundamentalist-
chartist model is capable of explaining a large portion of foreign exchange market 
expectations. Allowing panelists to switch between models significantly improves 
the fit of the model, especially at the relatively shorter forecast horizons. We find 
that the fundamentalist model is increasingly used as the forecast horizon extends. 
Finally, results indicate that model choice is based on a combination of period-
specific and individual-specific determinants. 
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1. Introduction 
Economics abounds with scenarios in which agents make decisions based on predictions 
of the future value of endogenously determined variables.  This is particularly true in 
financial markets.  It is quite common for competing forecasting models to coexist, each 
with its own adherents, possibly with shifting popularity over time. The empirical 
objective of this investigation is to determine whether systematic heterogeneity in 
forecasts exists consistent with the use of multiple identifiable models, whether market 
participants do engage in model switching, and what determines the decision to switch 
to an alternative model. The exercise will be conducted using data on the forecasts of the 
foreign exchange spot price submitted by financial market institutions active in the 
markets. 
 Behavioral finance has documented numerous examples in which psychological 
factors influence financial decision making; see Barber and Odean (2013) for a recent 
overview of the literature. A distinction is typically made between biases in preferences 
(i.e., deviations from the traditional Von Neumann-Morgenstern Expected Utility 
Theory) and biases in beliefs, or expectations (i.e., deviations from rational 
expectations). Whereas prospect theory (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979) is a proper 
alternative for modeling preferences, there is no consensus on an alternative for 
modeling expectations. All we know is that individual expectations deviate from 
rationality (see, e.g., Cavaglia et al, 1994) and that there are a number of documented 
biases in expectation formation, such as overconfidence (Huisman et al., 2012) and 
wishful thinking (Ito, 1990).  
 Stepping away from the rationality approach introduces a large number of 
degrees of freedom. A substantial body of literature in economics and finance therefore 
models investors as heterogeneous and adaptive. The heterogeneity in expectations 
allows the interaction between traders behaving differently to impact the market. The 
heterogeneity can exist in a market at equilibrium or may keep the market out of 
equilibrium. The adaptation allows traders to select behavior appropriate for the 
perceived, possibly changing, market setting. The sensitivity of the market to the 
behavior of the traders can produce market destabilizing feedback loops. 
 Despite wide application, there is surprisingly little micro-level evidence on the 
empirical validity of adaptive heterogeneity. This paper contributes to the still emerging 
literature that empirically tests for the presence of adaptive heterogeneity and estimates 
adaptive heterogeneous agent models. The estimation employs the reported forecasts of 
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financial market institutions on major exchange rates over a variety of horizons and 
currencies. The analysis seeks evidence of heterogeneity in the models across financial 
institutions to generate their forecasts at a given point in time. Additionally, the analysis 
seeks evidence of model switching by individual institutions over time. Procedures are 
developed to address empirical challenges encountered in the analysis. Finally, we study 
which type of determinants trigger panelists to switch between models.  
 Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) establish a theoretical foundation supporting the 
sustainable co-existence of fundamental and market-based trading strategies. The 
market-based traders are fully rational and their presence is based on their ability to 
extract costly information from the price at a cost advantage. A market-based strategy 
can also survive based on superior performance relative to a fundamental strategy, as in 
Goldbaum and Panchenko (2010). Dynamics arise as traders switch between trading 
strategies, as is the case in Brock and Hommes (1997, 1998) where past relative 
performance determines popularity. The model employs the random element in the 
discrete choice model of Manski and McFadden (1981) to create heterogeneity in the 
individual-level choice among the available options. The environment highlights the 
potentially inherent instability of markets as the minority strategy performs better. 
 Heterogeneous adaptive agent models provide structure and insight to 
explanations for market phenomena. Simulations based on such models generate 
empirical phenomena replicating features of actual market data; examples for the foreign 
exchange markets are De Grauwe and Grimaldi (2005, 2006), De Grauwe and 
Markiewicz (2008), and Spronk et al. (2013). Less prevalent in the literature are direct 
empirical tests of the features that drive the agent-based models.   
 Only a handful of papers have sought to estimate adaptive heterogeneous agent 
models directly, including the Boswijk, Hommes, and Manzan (2007) determination that 
trader switching between trend following and mean reverting strategies contributes to 
swings in the S&P 5000. Evidence of heterogeneity can also be found in the MacDonald 
and Marsh (1996) survey of market participants documenting the heterogeneity of 
beliefs and the employment of different models.  Branch (2004) finds evidence of 
adaptive heterogeneous behavior based on survey respondents’ reported inflation 
forecasts. 
 Adaptive heterogeneity contributes to the empirical modeling of a number of 
financial market phenomena.  Goldbaum and Mizrach (2008) use a model of adaptive 
heterogeneity to understand to allocation of new wealth into mutual funds. De Jong, 
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Verschoor and Zwinkels (2009) and (2010) find evidence of behavioral heterogeneity in 
setting equity prices across multiple markets and in foreign exchange rates respectively. 
Frijns, Lehnert, and Zwinkels (2010) find allowing multiple investor strategies 
simultaneously important for modeling the pricing of options.  Markiewicz (2012) use 
model uncertainty among traders to explain shifts in volatility in foreign exchange 
markets. 
 Evidence in favor of switching has also been found at the individual level in 
experimental settings.  Experiments involving market entry decisions often find a wide 
range of strategies have been employed by the participants that still combined to bring 
the market to the equilibrium number of entrants. Hommes et al (2005, 2007) identify 
four rule-of-thumb strategies employed by participants in a financial market setting 
rewarding conformity in expectation formation. Bloomfield and Hales (2002) show that 
even when forecasting a variable known to follow an exogenous random walk, 
participants switch between the simple rules of trend extrapolation and mean reversion. 
 A number of issues remains unresolved or are in need of empirical support.  The 
current project also seeks to examine markets for evidence of adaptive heterogeneity and 
also to determine whether there is evidence in favor of the fundamentalist – chartist 
dichotomy in foreign exchange markets. As with Branch (2004), the current project 
seeks to model the reported forecast of survey participants and thus we use a direct 
measure of individual investor expectations.1  This is in contrast to efforts to infer 
expectations from market realizations, such as Frankel and Froot (1990). Two features 
distinguish the current investigation from that of Branch (2004). First, currency markets 
offer an environment with strong direct positive feedback between market behavior and 
participant beliefs. This is especially true given the fact that the survey responses are 
from the large financial institutions that dominate the foreign exchange market. Second, 
Branch (2004) estimates the three alternative forecast models on the realized inflation 
data, imposing the resulting rules on the survey respondents. We estimate our alternative 
forecasting models on the reported forecasts themselves.  This introduces endogeneity in 
the sorting of forecasts between the model alternatives and the estimation of the model 
which is accommodated for in the empirical analysis. 
 In our case, the data being employed is the exchange rate forecasts collected 
from participating international financial institutions. Each period includes forecasts for 
                                                
1 Assuming that the survey response is an unbiased proxy for the respondent’s expectations. 
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the Euro/Dollar and Yen/Dollar exchange rates over the one, three, and twelve month 
forecast horizons for a number of individual institutions. Using the same data, Jongen et 
al. (2012) show that expectations are dispersed, and that panelists base expectations on 
fundamentalist/chartist types of considerations. Our results indicate that a combination 
of fundamentalism and chartism is indeed applied by the survey participants. Forcing 
panelists to be either fundamentalist or chartist over the full sample period does not 
improve the model fit. Allowing panelists to switch between the two models, however, 
does significantly improve the fit. The latter is especially true for the relatively shorter 
forecast horizons. Finally, we find that panelists use a combination of period specific 
and individual specific determinants for the switching decision. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the 
underlying model. Section 3 introduces the survey data used in the empirical section and 
Section 4 explains the empirical methodology applied. In Section 5 we present the 
results, and Section 6 concludes. 
 
2. Forecasting Models and Model Choice 
2.1 Fundamental model 
A population of foreign exchange market participants, labeled FN , consider the spot 
market exchange rate to be anchored by an underlying fundamental value.  Holding 
beliefs consistent with the foreign exchange market described in Frankel and Froot 
(1990), these “fundamentalists” allow for realized deviation in the spot rate from the 
fundamental.  Let te  and tf  represent the date t logarithm of the spot and fundamental 
market exchange rates respectively. As modeled in Mark (1995), the fundamentalists 
presume the spot market rate tends to revert to the fundamental value such that over a k  
period horizon, 
(1)  ,( )
t k
t k t t t k te f e
+
+Δ = − +β ν . (1)  
The notation t kte
+Δ  represents spot market innovation t k te e+ −  and kβ  captures the 
perceived rate of reversion, with [0,1]k ∈β . Allow that tf  follows a driftless random 
walk so that 
(2)  1 1t t tf f+ += +η  (2)  
with tη  as the random fundamental innovation term. 
 Using notation 1=β β  and 1 , 1t t t+ +=ν ν , for 1k = , 
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(3)  1 1( )
t
t t t te f e
+
+Δ = − +β ν . (3)  
Rearrange (3) to reveal that the value of 1te +  reflects a weighted combination of the 
previous spot price and the most recently realized fundamental, 
(4)  1 1(1 )t t t te e f+ += − + +β β ν . (4)  
Using (2) and (3), we obtain a recursive expression of 1tte
+Δ , 
(5)  1 1 1(1 )
t t
t t t t te e
+
− +Δ = − Δ − + +β ν βη ν , (5)  
revealing that the spot market exchange rate follows a predictable path of adjustment, 
shocked each period by two random processes. The innovation in the spot rate from t  to 
1t +  includes a β  weighted partial adjustment to the most recently observed innovation 
to the fundamental rate, tη .  Additionally, the future 1t+ν  causes 1te +  to deviate from the 
predictable adjustment towards tf .  The predictable element of (5), 1(1 )
t
t te −− Δ −β ν , is 
the mechanism through which prior shocks continue to influence current innovations. In 
the absence of shocks, the previously determined components would, over time, 
complete the previous partial adjustments to fundamental innovations and dissipate the 
influence of the transitory errors. 2 
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+ + − + − −
=
= − + − −∑ν β ν β η . (6)  
As reflected in the coefficients in (6), the transitory uncertainty originating from the tν  
induced deviation dissipate away while the persistent tη  innovations to the fundamental 
value accumulate over the forecast horizon.  
 As with the 1-period innovation, t kte
+Δ  can also be expressed recursively. The 








t k t k







Δ = − Δ − + +∑β ν β η ν  (7)  
 Expressed in terms of the observable spot and the underlying fundamental rates, 
using the notation 1ˆ ( )
F
t t tx E x−= , (5) and (7) become, respectively, 
                                                
2 Without t−ν  in (5), the originally positive impact of tν  on te  would be perpetuated into the current and 
future innovations through 1(1 )
t
te −− Δβ .  The t−ν  reverses the sign of the influence and initiates the 
reversal of its influence on the future spot rates. 
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(8)  1 1 1 1 1ˆ ˆ(1 ) ( ) ( ) ( )
t t t
t t t t t t te e e e f e e
+
− − + +Δ = − Δ − − + Δ + −β β  (8)  
and 
(9)   1 11 1ˆ ˆ(1 ) ( ) ( ) ( )
t k t k t k
t t t t t t k t ke e e e f e e
+ + − + −
− − + +Δ = − Δ − − + Δ + −β β . (9)  
 
2.2 Chartist model 
A second population of market participants, referred to as “chartists,” employs market-
based information to indicate future innovations in the spot market exchange rate.  Let 
CN  represent the chartist population.  The chartists employ a trend following model of 
exchange rate innovation believing that 
(10)  1 1 1( )
t t
t t te e
+
− +Δ = Δ +α φ  (10)  
with tφ  as the random innovation term.  Over a k -period horizon,  
(11)  1 ,( )
t k t
t k t t t ke e
+
− +Δ = Δ +α φ  (11)  


























Let , ( )
h t k
i t tE e
+Δ  indicate the forecast of participant i where h F=  if Fi N∈  and h C=  if 
Ci N∈ . The Fi N∈  participant develops a forecast model, , ( )
F t k
i t tE e
+Δ , based on (9), the 
product of which is 
(12)  1, , 1 1 1 , 1 , ,ˆ( ) (1 ) ( ) ( ( ))
F t k t k t F
i t t i t t t t i t t i t kE e E e f e E e
+ + −
− − − −Δ = − Δ + Δ − − +β β ε . (12)  
In (12), participant i ’s actual forecast from 1t − , 1, 1 1( )
t k
i t tE e
+ −






−Δ  in (9). Similarly, the participant’s own forecast , 1 , 1 1( ) ( )i t t i t t tE e E e e− − −= Δ −  
replaces tˆe . Also, the fundamentalist, while adherent to the notion of a fundamental 
exchange rate, does not get to observe its value. The market participant is thus forced to 
estimate it from other sources. Let tˆf  represent the fundamental market participants’ 














⎛ ⎞Δ = =⎜ ⎟
⎝ ⎠
∑η  and 
 Et (et+k − eˆt+k ) = Et (ν t+k ) = 0  completes the transition from (9) to (12) with , ,
F
i t kε  
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capturing the idiosyncratic component of the k -period forecast horizon, , ,( ) 0
F
i t kE =ε  
and , , , ,( )
F F
i t k j t kE ε ε , j i≠ . 
 There are two sources of heterogeneity among those employing the fundamental 
model. The idiosyncratic term, , ,
F
i t kε , captures trader specific differences between the 
forecasts of individual traders.  These can be seen as the result of private information not 
otherwise captured by the model, deviation in the objective function from the presumed 
utility function, deviations resulting from heterogeneity in the estimate of the 
fundamental rate, or simply the result of randomness in the traders forecasting method.  
The presence of , ,
F
i t ke  contributes to the second source of heterogeneity, the individual-
specific choice patterns that perpetuate different individual forecasts histories appearing 
in the first and third terms on the RHS of (12). 
 Based on (11), participant Ci N∈  forecasts 
(13)  , 1 , ,( )
C t k t C
i t t k t i t kE e e
+
−Δ = Δ +α ε  (13)  
with , ,
C
i t kε  capturing individual forecast deviation from the predicted model and the only 
source of heterogeneity in among the chartist population. 
 
2.4 Model choice and estimation 
Equations (12) and (13) identify two distinct methods for forecasting exchange rate 
innovation employing different foundational information.  Variations in how these two 
forecasts models are combined and estimated indicate whether the data support different 
forms of heterogeneity and switching of methods among the financial institutions. 
 The benchmark model incorporates the two information sets, fundamental and 
chartist, into a single equation, 
(14)  , 1 1 , 1 1ˆˆ ( ) (1 ) ( ( ))
B t k t t t
i t t t t t i t t k tE e e f e E e e
+
− − − −Δ = − Δ + Δ − − + Δβ β α . (14)  
Implicit in (14) is the notion that financial institutions incorporate both information sets 
in forming their forecasts. The model is misspecified in the presence of heterogeneity or 
switching between information sets. 
 The alternative empirical models incorporate heterogeneity. Forecasts are 
presumed to originate from the two distinct forecasting models; the fundamentalist 
model and chartist model. The models are evaluated in two different employment 
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settings. The forecast of the individual financial institution can be expressed as 
originating from  
(15)   , , , ,ˆ ˆ( ) ( ) (1 ) ( )
t k F t k C t k
i t t i t t t i t t t i tE e E e E e
+ + +Δ = Δ + − Δ +θ θ ε  (15)  
where ˆ ( )F t kt tE e
+Δ  and ˆ ( )C t kt tE e
+Δ  are the fitted components of (12) and (13) respectively.  
That is, 
(16)  1, , 1 1 1 , 1ˆˆ ( ) (1 ) ( ) ( ( ))
F t k t k t
i t t i t t t t i t tE e E e f e E e
+ + −
− − − −= − −Δ Δ + Δ −β β , (16)  
(17)  , 1ˆ ( )
C t k t
i t t k tE e e
+
−Δ = Δα . (17)  
 The two different settings consider two different models of classification, each of 
which is capture by the process determining the value of ,i tθ . 
 
Classification 1 - Static model: 
In this variation ,i t i t= ∀θ θ and {0,1}i ∈θ .  Thus, the forecast model used by financial 
institution i throughout the sample is either the fundamental model or the chartists 
model. This configuration allows for heterogeneity between institutions but no 
adaptation, i.e., no time-variation in the forecast method. The value of iθ  is determined 
by the average relative proximity of the forecast to the two models, 
(18)  
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
2 2
, , , ,
1 1
2 2
, , , ,
1 1
ˆ ˆ1 if ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
ˆ ˆ0 if ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) .
T T
t k F t k t k C t k
i t t i t t i t t i t t
t t
i T T
t k C t k t k F t k
i t t i t t i t t i t t
t t
E e E e E e E e
E e E e E e E e
+ + + +
= =
+ + + +
= =
⎧ Δ − Δ < Δ − Δ⎪⎪θ = ⎨
⎪ Δ − Δ ≤ Δ − Δ⎪⎩
∑ ∑
∑ ∑
 (18)  
 
Classification 2 –Dynamic model: 
In this second variation, , {0,1}i t ∈θ .  The forecast model used by financial institution i in 
period t is either the fundamental model or the chartists model. Hence, we allow 
institutions to switch between models over time. The value of ,i tθ  is determined by the 
relative proximity of the forecast to the two models, 
(19)  
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
2 2
, , , ,
, 2 2
, , , ,
ˆ ˆ1 if ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
ˆ ˆ0 if ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) .
t k F t k t k C t k
i t t i t t i t t i t t
i t
t k C t k t k F t k
i t t i t t i t t i t t
E e E e E e E e
E e E e E e E e
+ + + +
+ + + +
⎧ Δ − Δ < Δ − Δ⎪θ = ⎨
⎪ Δ − Δ ≤ Δ − Δ⎩
 (19)  
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 In the remainder of the paper, we estimate the benchmark (13), static (14-17), 
and dynamic (14-16, 18) models on a dataset of survey expectation, and determine 
which gives the best representation of the survey responses. 
 
3. Data 
3.1 Survey Expectations 
To investigate the behavioral aspects of the forecasts of market participants, we use a 
unique database of survey-based exchange rate forecasts. The individual forecasts are 
obtained from a survey conducted by Consensus Economics of London on a monthly 
basis among leading market participants in the foreign exchange market, investment 
banks, and professional forecasting agencies. Examples of panelist companies are 
Morgan Stanley, Oxford Economic Forecasting, Deutsche Bank Research, and BNP 
Paribas. The full list of panelists is given in the Appendix. The panelists companies are 
located worldwide, although they are all from developed economies. The forecasts are 
point forecasts for a large set of currencies against the U.S. dollar and are available for 
horizons of 1, 3 and 12 months ahead. The names of the panelist companies are 
revealed. 
Although survey participants have a few days to return their forecasts, we learned 
that the vast majority send their responses by e-mail on the Friday before the publication 
day, which is typically the second Monday of the month. We consider this Friday to be 
the day on which the forecasts are formed and assume that the beliefs are translated one-
to-one in a point forecast. To verify that the information sets of market participants are 
not too diverse, all of the analyses throughout this study were re-estimated using spot 
data from various days surrounding this Friday, yet the overall results remain virtually 
unchanged. 
There may be reasons for panelists not to reveal their true beliefs. One motive may 
be that agents do not want to expose their (private) information to other market 
participants. This effect is mitigated by the reputation effect that this survey can have. 
When the names of the forecasters are given in the survey publication (as is the case 
with our data), agents have an incentive to formulate a response that is close to their true 
informed belief. Therefore, in the remainder of the paper we will assume that the survey 
responses are an unbiased proxy of the institutions’ actual expectations, and will use the 
terms interchangeably.  
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In this study we use the forecasts for the Japanese Yen and the Euro3 against the U.S. 
dollar (i.e., in foreign currency per US Dollar) from 31 unique respondents for the 
period of November 1995 through December 2007, which are 146 monthly 
observations.4 This period is of particular interest since it contains several financial 
crises, the introduction of a single monetary currency unit, and several large changes in 
the level of the exchange rates. The panel is unbalanced since the response rate of the 
individual market participants is less than 100 percent and due to market participants 
leaving the panel and subsequently replaced by others. Analyses are done on the 1, 3, 
and 12 months forecasting horizon. The 1 month forecasts are also used as a control 
variable for the models of the 3 and 12 months horizon (see Section 2). 
 
< Insert Table 1 Here > 
 
 Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics of the survey data. Respondents are 
consistent across currencies and forecast horizons in answering the survey; i.e., if they 
answer one, they answer all six. The median response rate per period is 70%, which 
results in an average total number of observations per currency/horizon pair of 
approximately 2,900.  
 The descriptive statistics of the expected exchange rate returns in panel b) 
indicate there is a wide variety in answers, ranging from -30 to +45%. Median expected 
returns are all slightly negative, suggesting a median expected depreciation of the US 
Dollar. The kurtosis indicates that, as is the case for market returns, the distribution of 
expectations is heavy tailed. The expected returns are strongly auto correlated, which is 
inconsistent with actual FOREX returns. Partly, the autocorrelation in expectations is 
due to overlapping observations, i.e., the frequency of the data is higher than the forecast 
horizon. The autocorrelations for the one-month forecast horizon, however, which do 
not suffer from the overlapping observations issue, suggest that panelists also rely 
heavily on previous period’s expectation in forming current expectations. 
 
 
                                                
3 The database also contains U.K. Pound expectations. However, for unknown reasons, the U.K. Pound 
expectations are only reported every other month. We do not use this currency because of the limited 
number of observations. 
4 Prior to January 1999 forecasts on the Deutschemark versus the U.S. Dollar are used. These forecasts are 
transformed into Euro / U.S. dollar forecasts using the official conversion rate. 
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3.2 Fundamental Value 
The fundamentalist expectation, given by (12), includes a term representing the (partial) 
accommodation to perceived changes in the fundamental value, 1ˆ
t
tf −Δ . Important 
subsequent question is the econometrician’s choice for calculating the panelist’s 
perceived fundamental exchange rate tˆf . The issue here is not necessarily to select an 
estimate that represents the true fundamental exchange rate, but a model that is 
appropriate for capturing the panelist’s fundamental-based forecasts of the exchange 
rate. We propose a version of the monetary model introduced by Mark (1995) given by 
(20)  * *ˆ ( ) ( )t t t t tf m m y y= − + −  (20)  
Here, mt is the home money supply, *tm  the foreign money supply, yt the home income, 
and *ty  the foreign income. The choice for this model is based on two arguments. First, 
the study by Mark (1995) is well known and one of the few persuasive studies 
illustrating the forecasting power of a fundamental model.  Second, this fundamental 
value is relatively simple to implement; that is, it does not require any further estimation. 
This ensures that no additional choices or assumptions regarding the estimation process 
are required. 
 Data wise, all non-survey based data is retrieved from Datastream. M2 is used 
for the money supply mt and industrial production for income yt. Figure 1 displays the 
(log) exchange rates and fundamental exchange rates for both the Yen and the Euro. 
 




Unique to the current examination (to our best knowledge) is the fact that different 
models under consideration are endogenous to the traders employing them. Branch 
(2004), in contrasts, considers three exogenous models of inflation. Branch’ (2004) 
naïve expectation model has 1
e
t t+π = π .  The two more sophisticated models are a model 
of adaptive expectations and a VAR.  In both cases, the parameters of the model are 
chosen to fit realized inflation. Thus, the models are optimized to minimize the error of 
the forecast of inflation rather than to capture the model employed by the forecaster. 
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In the presence of multiple forecasting models, each forecast should be employed 
to estimate only the model used to generate it. Unfortunately, the information on the 
model being employed to generate the forecast is not available to the researcher.  The 
methodology outlined below includes a procedure for simultaneously estimating 
multiple models from the observed forecasts and classifying the forecasts according to 
the estimated models. 
 The approach in this examination is to have those traders employing the model 
indicate the parameters of the model5. By doing so, we do not impose (nor rule out) that 
forecasters minimize a certain forecast error; we rather give a direct description of 
expectation formation. This is accomplished by choosing the parameters to minimize the 
mean squared error of the forecast by those traders who employ the forecast. This 
involves some degree of simultaneity as the estimation of the model depends on how the 
individuals are sorted and the sorting depends on the model.  Our solution is to estimate, 
sort, and then re-estimate over a number of iterations until the sorting and the model 
parameters settle.  
 Specifically, the estimation procedure for the discrete choice model is as follows. 
First, the fundamental and chartist models are estimated separately for each institution in 
a single equation using OLS. The initial distribution of agents over groups is done by 
estimating the two expectation formation models (12) and (13) individually per 
respondent. Based on best fit, given by either (18) or (19), each respondent or each 
observation is subsequently classified as either fundamentalist or chartist.6 Next, the two 
rules are estimated using OLS in a single equation in a pooled setup, given by (15) – 
(17), using the initial distribution of respondents as values of ,i tθ . The distribution of 
respondents across groups, i.e., ,i tθ , is subsequently updated based on the new estimation 
results using (18) or (19), and the equation is re-estimated. This procedure is repeated 
until convergence, i.e. until respondents do not change groups anymore and coefficient 
estimates of the rules are constant. Generally, this occurs within ten iterations, 
conditional on the complexity of the model. As such, the classification of agents and the 
                                                
5 The finite mixture estimation methodology is closely related to ours (see Beard et al., 1991). Finite 
mixture, however, extracts the degree of heterogeneity in the constituents in a data set from the aggregated 
values. In our case, we have access to the individual expectations. Focusing solely on the aggregate 
expectation, therefore, would be inefficient use of information. 
6 There exists a certain path dependency conditional on the initial distribution of agents. Throughout, we 
perform a grid search over initial conditions to find the global optimum; we report the solution with the 
best fit. 
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actual expectation formation rules are being updated endogenously in the iteration 
process.  
 For the simultaneous estimation of the two models, the parameter constraints 
implied structurally by (12) are imposed in the empirical estimation of the two 
heterogeneous classification models (such as β  and (1 )− β ).  Given the endogenous 
allocation of observations between the two forecasting models, allowing the parameters 
to be determined freely runs the risk of enabling the parameters to adjust to alter the 
allocation of observations to the incorrect model to better fit the data. Once misallocated, 
the erroneously assigned forecast would contribute to a biased estimation of the final 
model parameters. 
The autocorrelation in the residuals due to the overlapping data issue is captured 
by the construction of the models (12) and (13). Any remaining auto-correlation is 
accounted for by calculating Newey-West standard errors, as in MacDonald (2000).  
 
5. Results 
5.1 Estimation Results 
Table 2 presents the results for the benchmark, static, and dynamic models estimated on 
the Euro/USD and Yen/USD exchange rate forecasts. 
 
< Insert Table 2 Here > 
 
 At each forecast horizon and for both currencies, the benchmark model is found 
to provide some power to explain the forecasts, which is an indication that both the 
chartist and the fundamentalist derived information are relevant for the panelists. The 
exception is the 1-month forecasts for both currencies, for which we only find a 
significant kα .
7 The fit of the benchmark model increases with the forecast horizon, 
indicating the increased use of the proposed models as the horizon extends.  
The chartist coefficient kα  is negative and highly significant for all currency-
horizon combinations in the benchmark model. A negative kα  implies that panelists 
expect a reversion of previous returns and therefore act like contrarians. The reversion 
increases on the longer horizons, which is explained by the fact that we include the 1-
                                                
7 The slightly negative adjusted R2 is caused by the term , 1( ( ) )i t t tE e e− − in the fundamentalist model. 
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period lagged return for the k-period-ahead forecast. This finding is consistent with the 
literature on survey expectations; see MacDonald (2000) for an overview. 8  The 
estimated kα ’s for the Yen are somewhat smaller than for the Euro, suggesting that 
contrarian behavior is stronger in the Yen/USD market than the Euro/USD market. 
The fundamentalist coefficient β  is, apart from the 1-month horizon, always 
positive and significant for the benchmark model. A positive β  implies expected mean 
reversion towards the fundamental value. Note, that this finding serves two important 
purposes: 1) our fundamental value estimate is a reasonable approximation of the 
fundamental value perceived by panelists, and 2) the panelists expect mean-reversion 
towards this imposed fundamental value. When moving from the 3 to the 12-month 
forecast horizon, the estimated β  decreases for both currencies. This suggests panelists’ 
greater reliance on previous forecasts and reduced reliance on new fundamental 
information when forecasting over longer horizons than is consistent with the 1-period 
horizon forecast.  
 The second column, labeled static model, splits the sample of panelists in two 
groups, fundamentalists and chartists, based on best fit using (18) as selection 
mechanism. The assumption is that panelists remain of a certain type throughout the 
sample period. A number of differences arise when comparing the results of the 
benchmark models to those of the static models. First, with regards to the 
fundamentalists’ reversion β , the effect size becomes notably stronger and significant 
for the 1-month horizon for both currencies. As for the chartist coefficient kα , the effect 
size is also stronger compared to the benchmark model but the significance levels are 
equally high.  
The percentage of panelists that uses the fundamentalist model in forming 
expectations increases as the forecast horizon increases. The increase is substantial for 
both currencies, with an increase from 3.1 to 95.5% for the Euro and from 7.7 to 92.6% 
for the Yen. Given that we have 31 unique panelists, this implies that only one panelist 
applies the chartist model for the 12-month horizon. Interestingly, this is the same 
panelist for both currencies: General Motors. This result suggests that panelists are 
consistent in their choice of model over different currencies. Hence, the choice of model 
                                                
8 On shorter horizons (less than one month), survey expectations are found to be of the momentum type. 
Apparently, the 1-month horizon is perceived to be the long run. 
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contains individual specific determinants, and not only currency or time specific 
determinants. 
The image that arises when comparing the R2 of the benchmark model to that of 
the static model is mixed, though. In three out of six cases, the model fit decreases. 
Given the increased flexibility of the model, this is an indication that the static model 
should not be seen as a proper description of the expectation formation process of 
panelists. 
 The final columns in Table 2, labeled dynamic, report the results of estimating 
the model captured by (16) and (17) in which panelists are allowed to update their 
forecasting strategy each period according to (19). Hence, instead of considering the 
average distance between the rule and the expectation over the full sample period, the 
selection procedure is applied per period and panelists are allowed to switch between the 
two models.  
The increased flexibility changes the estimation results substantially. The chartist 
contrarian behavior becomes stronger for both currencies and all horizons. The effect 
size of the fundamental model β  tends to decrease somewhat, apart from the 1-month 
Euro/USD expectations.  
The percentage of periods in which the fundamental model is employed increases 
with the forecast horizon, as was the case with the static model, though the increase is in 
a narrower band ranging from 43.5 to 65.9% for the Euro and from 42.8 to 65.5% for the 
Yen. The use of the fundamental model is approximately equal across currencies. The 
autocorrelation in model choice increases as the forecast horizon increases, and ranges 
from 8 to 25%. This implies that panelist have less tendency to switch models for the 
longer horizons. In the 3- and 12-month horizons, the model choice in the Euro/USD 
expectations tends to be more persistent than the Yen. 
The fit of the model is substantially higher in the dynamic case compared to the 
benchmark case. While the model fit did not give a clear improvement when moving 
from the benchmark model to the model with static classification, having dynamic 
classification does matter notably in the parameter estimates and the division of the 
population. At this point, however, we cannot conclude whether the dynamic model is 
significantly better than the benchmark model, because the additional number of degrees 
of freedom the dynamic model consumes is unclear. The next section will study this 
issue in more detail using a simulation setup. 
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 The estimation results reported in Tables 2 suggest that the fundamentalist and 
the chartist forecasting rules are being used by the panelists in the survey. The 
fundamentalist-chartist dichotomy, as suggested in Frankel and Froot (1990) and 
subsequently often applied in the literature therefore appears a relevant classification, 
consistent with the findings of, among others, Allen and Taylor (1990, 1992), and 
Jongen et al. (2012). The flexibility of agents to change strategy is of great importance. 
There is a substantial improvement in the fit after introducing switching. This is direct 
evidence in favor of the heterogeneous agent models with switching, as introduced in 
Brock and Hommes (1997, 1998).  
 
5.2 Selective power of the model 
To ascertain the validity of the estimation results in Section 5.1 in general and the 
iterative selection procedure specifically, this section looks into the selective power of 
the procedure. As such, we proceed with two analyses. First, we look into the selective 
power of the methodology by checking the consistency of the selection mechanism. We 
divide the panel observations into two separate subsamples of the data set according to 
their identification as originating from either the fundamentalist or chartist forecasting 
model as determined by the estimated static and dynamic models. We proceed to then 
estimate anew both the fundamental model and the chartist model using each of the 
newly created subsamples in order to compare the fit of each model on each of the 
subsamples.  
Second, we need to study whether the increase in R2 of the dynamic model 
relative to the benchmark model is significant. The increase in model fit cannot be 
interpreted directly because it is unclear how many extra degrees of freedom the 
dynamic model consumes. For each observation, the selection procedure determines the 
optimal θi,t. This, however, does not imply that the dynamic model consumes one 
additional degree of freedom per observation, because θi,t  only takes the values zero or 
one. Furthermore, the θi,t are determined outside the regression equation. In other words, 
the benchmark model is not nested in the dynamic model.  
To determine the significance of the dynamic model, we simulate the benchmark 
model for all six currency/horizon combinations. As such, we know that the data 
generating process of the simulated data is non-dynamic. Subsequently, we estimate 
both the benchmark and dynamic model on the simulated data and compare the increase 
in R2 to the empirically observed increase in R2. We run 1,000 simulations generating 
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the same number of observations as the empirical dataset (i.e., 31 respondents with 146 
time-series observations). If the empirically observed increase in R2 is exceeded by the 
simulations in less than 50 cases (5% of 1,000), we can conclude that the dynamic 
model gives a significantly better model fit than the benchmark model at the 5% 
confidence level.  
 Table 3 presents the results of the first method, the consistency checks, checking 
the discriminative power of the static model (i.e., selection based on 17). Table 4 
similarly presents the results checking the discriminative power of the switching model 
(i.e., selection based on 18). 
 
< Insert Table 3 Here > 
< Insert Table 4 Here > 
 
 Given the qualitative similarity between Tables 3 and 4, we will discuss the 
results simultaneously. Focusing on the R2 of the different Group/Model combinations, 
we observe a clear pattern. When estimated on the fundamental identified observations, 
the fit of the newly estimated fundamental model is considerably better than the fit of 
the chartist model. Likewise, when estimated on the chartist identified observations, the 
fit of the newly estimated chartist model is considerably better than the fit of the 
fundamental model.9 These results are indications that the selection mechanism correctly 
discriminates between two subsamples of survey observations, consistent with the two 
models.  
 The R2 of the benchmark model is generally equal to the R2 or not significantly 
higher than the R2 of the fundamental model for the subsample of fundamentalists. 
Hence, the chart model does not contain additional explanatory power for the 
fundamentalists.  
 The coefficients β  and kα  are typically significant for both models per 
subsample. The difference between the coefficients estimated for the chartist subsample 
and fundamentalist subsample, however, are typically sizeable. The estimated β  for the 
chartist subsamples is often larger than unity. This is inconsistent with the fundamental 
                                                
9  The negative R2’s for some of the estimations of the fundamental model are caused by the 
, 1( ( ) )i t t tE e e− −  term. Because this term does not have a coefficient, it introduces the possibility that the 
left hand side variable in the regression has a lower variance than the right hand side variables. 
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model.10 These observations are another indication that the iterative selection procedure 
did a good job in discriminating between two subsamples of observations.  
 Having established that the empirical strategy contains selective power, i.e., it 
correctly classifies panelists and individual expectations of panelists as being of the 
fundamentalist or the chartist type, the subsequent question is whether the selection 
significantly increases the explanatory power of the model. Table 5 presents the results 
of the simulation study explained above.  
 
< Insert Table 5 Here > 
 
 The top panel of Table 5 presents the empirical difference in R2 between the 
benchmark model and the switching model, as observed in Table 2, as well as the 
distribution of differences in R2 retrieved from the Monte Carlo simulation. As 
suggested above, if the empirically observed difference is exceeded in less than 50 out of 
1000 simulations, we can conclude that the dynamic model adds significantly to the 
explanatory power of the model.  
 For both currencies for the 1 and 3- month horizons, the null-hypothesis of no 
difference in explanatory power between the benchmark and dynamic models is rejected 
at the 0.1% level. For the 12-month horizon, the null is rejected at the 5% level for the 
Euro, while it is rejected only at a 20.0% level for the Yen. Hence, for all but one 
currency/horizon pair, the results suggest that the panelists apply a dynamic model in 
forming expectations. Dynamics appear to play a larger role for the relatively short 
horizons. This is consistent with the observation from Table 2 that panelists use the 
fundamental model in the majority of cases with a relatively large persistence (AC); this 
already suggests that panelists do not often switch between models at the longest 
horizon. 
 Panels B and C of Table 5 examine the difference between the R2 of the 
fundamental model and the R2 of the chartist model for the fundamentalist subsample 
and chartist subsample, respectively. As in Panel A, we compare the empirically 
observed difference from Table 4 with the distribution of simulated differences.  
Panel B indicates that the observed difference in R2 is never matched by the 
simulations for the 3-month horizon. For the other horizons, the difference is not 
                                                
10 A 1 2< <β  implies fundamentalist believe in an oscillating, rather than smooth, convergence process 
in the spot rate towards the fundamental value. 
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significant. For the chartist group in Panel C, however, we again observe that the null of 
equal fit for both models is rejected at the 0.1% level.. Hence, the empirical consistency 
results for the dynamic model, as presented in Table 4, could not have been obtained 
from the benchmark data generating process. In other words, the true data generating 
process is significantly better captured by the dynamic model containing both 
fundamentalist and chartist elements. 
 
5.3 Model choice 
A natural subsequent question to ask is what are the determinants of model choice. We 
distinguish between two types of determinants, namely those specific to the individual 
panelist and those specific to the current market circumstance. The former causes a 
single panelist to choose a certain model across all currency/horizon combinations 
whereas the latter causes different individuals to choose a certain model for a single 
currency/horizon combination. 
 Within the heterogeneous agent literature, the agents switch based on past 
profitability of the models; see Brock and Hommes (1998) or De Grauwe and Grimaldi 
(2006) for the foreign exchange market. Because the profitability measure is equal for 
all agents, this is an example of a period specific determinant of model choice. Because 
the performance measure is conditional on the developments in a certain market, this 
causes model choice across individuals to be correlated for a specific currency/horizon 
combination. Also, if model choice is consistent in different forecast horizons, model 
choice based on period specific determinants induces correlation between the model 
choices within a currency for the different horizons.  
 
< Insert Figure 2 Here > 
 
To illustrate the period specific determinants of model choice, Figure 2 presents 
the evolution of the average percentage fundamentalists (i.e., the average percentage of 
panelists that chooses the fundamental model per period) for all six currency / horizon 
pairs. If model choice is not based on period specific determinants, this average per 
period should be roughly constant and changes in this average should be random. First 
of all, the figures illustrate that there is ample time variation in the choice of models. 
The percentages range from zero – all panelists apply the chartist model – to one – all 
panelists apply the fundamental model. Apart from short term patterns, we can also 
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discern longer term patterns, such as the decrease in the choice of fundamental model for 
the 12-month Euro forecasts over the first 25 periods. Interestingly, the same pattern can 
be seen for the 3-month Euro forecasts. More generally there are similar patterns in the 
averages, especially within a currency. In addition, it can be seen that the choice of 
fundamental model increases as the horizon increases, as was already concluded from 
the results in Table 2. All in all, the figures suggest that there are period specific factors 
triggering panelists to choose either model. 
On the other hand, agents might have an unconditional preference for a certain 
model, regardless of its (time-varying) performance. Status quo bias (Kahneman and 
Tversky, 1974) induces people to prefer the current state of affairs, as any deviation 
from the status quo is perceived as a loss. This induces the choice of model to be 
independent of the performance of the models, even though the outcome might be 
detrimental to overall forecasting performance. Because the status quo is specific to the 
panelist, this is an individual specific determinant of model choice and introduces a 
correlation between model choices for one individual across different currency/horizon 
combinations.  
 
< Insert Figure 3 Here > 
 
Figure 3 illustrates the percentage of periods in which each individual panelist 
chooses the fundamental model. If there are no individual specific determinants of 
model choice, the averages per individual should be roughly equal and differences 
between individuals should be random. In Figure 3, there are clear differences between 
the average tendencies of panelists to choose the fundamental model, ranging from zero 
– always chartist – to one – always fundamentalist. Again we observe the increase in the 
use of fundamental model as the forecast horizon increases. Interestingly, we observe 
some similarities among all six figures. The most striking similarity across all figures is 
the continuously low score for panelist number six, which is Barclays Bank. Apart from 
the 12-month Euro forecast, Barclays Bank consistently scores as (one of the) panelist 
making least use of the fundamental model.  
For a somewhat more formal analysis of the relation between model choices 
across time and across individuals, Table 6 presents the pooled, within period, and 
within individual correlations across currency and horizons between model choices. 
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< Insert Table 6 Here > 
 
Panel A displays the pooled correlation between model choices; it thus combines 
the period- and individual- specific elements. The correlations between different 
horizons within a certain currency, in upper left and lower right quadrants, show highly 
significant positive correlations. For both the Euro/USD and Yen/USD forecast, there is 
a strong relation between the model choices for different forecast horizons. The 
correlations between the one and three month forecasts are highest (around 40%), 
followed by the correlations between the three and twelve month forecasts (around 
26%). This is an indication that period-specific determinants matter for model choice, as 
choice is expected to be consistent across horizons. 
The correlations between currencies, in the lower left quadrant, are also positive 
and oftentimes significant as well. The between currency correlations are typically close 
to 5%. The choices for the 1-month Euro forecasts are significantly correlated to the 
choices for all three Yen horizons. The twelve month Euro forecast is only related to the 
twelve month Yen forecasts. This is an indication that individual specific determinants 
matter for model choice. 
Panel B displays the within period correlations; i.e., the correlations between the 
146 average uses of the fundamental model per period as displayed in Figure 2. This 
indicates whether average model choice per period is correlated across the six 
currency/horizon combinations and is therefore an illustration of the importance of 
period specific determinants of model choice. Panel B yields a rather different image 
than Panel A. In Panel B, only the within currency correlations in the lower right and 
upper left quadrants are positive and significant. The between currency correlations are 
all insignificant. This implies that the period specific determinants that cause panelists to 
choose a certain model do not correlate strongly between the two currencies. The within 
currency correlations, though, are all substantially higher than we observed in Panel A. 
This is an indication that the within currency correlations between model choices are for 
an important part driven by period specific determinants. Hence, the external factor(s) 
causing panelists to choose a certain model at one horizon also causes panelists to 
choose that model at other horizons. 
Panel C gives the within individual correlations, i.e., the correlations between the 
31 time-series average choices per individual as displayed in Figure 3. This indicates 
whether an individual has the tendency to make the same choice across the six 
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currency/horizon combinations. Panel C generally gives the opposite result of Panel B: 
The within individual correlations in Panel C are typically high and significant for the 
between currency correlations in the lower left quadrant and less so for the within 
currency correlations (the latter especially for the Yen) in the upper left and lower right 
quadrants. The between currency correlations in the lower left quadrant reach up to 67% 
for the model choice between the 1-month Euro and 1-month Yen forecasts. Given that 
the between currency correlations are not significant in Panel B whereas they are in 
Panel A and in Panel C, we can conclude that the between currency correlations are 
driven by individual specific determinants.  
The results show that panelists have certain idiosyncratic preferences for a 
certain model next to period specific determinants such as lagged profitability, and as a 
result have a higher tendency to apply that particular model for other forecasts they 
make, regardless the currency or horizon that is considered and regardless the current 
market conditions. If the panelists in our sample trade on their expectations, this might 
have important consequences for the market in general. Specifically, consider the 
chartist model. The chartist model always forecasts a contrarian pattern in the exchange 
rate. If agents decide to apply the chartist model across different currencies based on 
individual preferences, regardless the market conditions, this might induce excess cross-
currency correlations.  
 
6. Conclusion 
A model has been developed to examine the behavior of financial institutions when 
forming forecasts of future exchange rate innovations over a variety of currencies and 
time horizons. The model allows for market participants to switch between different 
strategies for forming expectations. A model based on two strategies is developed, a 
fundamental strategy by which predictions concerning future exchange rates are based 
on exchange rate fundamentals and a chartist strategy by which market based 
information serves as a predictor of future exchange rates. 
 The empirical analysis suggests that the switching model is useful for explaining 
the heterogeneity in the forecasts of the different banking institutions that took part in 
the survey. Allowing the panelists to switch strategies during the sample period 
improved the fit of the model significantly, especially at the relatively short forecast 
horizons. In addition, we find that model choice is based on a combination of period 
specific and individual specific determinants. The former means that certain market 
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circumstances induce panelists to choose a particular model. The latter implies that if a 
panelist chooses a model for one currency/horizon combination, she has the tendency to 
make the same choice for the other currency/horizon combinations. It provides an 
attractive narrative of market behavior that is consistent with stylized facts.  
 Allen and Taylor (1990) document the use of chartist techniques among foreign 
exchange traders. Individual traders explain that it is not necessarily that they believe 
that charting captures fundamentals, but that the market can be driven by chartists since 
they are so plentiful in the foreign exchange markets. For this reason, it is important to 
include chartist tools when considering trades. Presumably, the same is true when 
forming predictions. The fact that forecasts of financial institutions appear to be driven, 
at times, by a chartist model may be a reflection of the fact that institutions believe that 
the market based information is informative about market innovations away from 
fundamentals. The results could also be considered supportive of the notion that market 
based information is useful for predicting fundamental innovations supported by private 
information not available to the modeler. The latter interpretation is consistent with 
Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) and other papers that argue in favor of the use of chartists 
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Table A1: Panelists 
1. ABN AMRO Bank 
2. Bank of America 
3. Bank of Tokyo Mitsubishi 
4. Bankers Trust Company 
5. BNP Paribas 
6. Barclays Bank 
7. Barclay's Capital 
8. Chase Manhattan 
9. Citigroup 
10. Commerzbank 
11. Credit Suisse First Boston 
12. Deutsche Bank Research 
13. Dresdner Kleinwort Wasserstein 
14. General Motors 
15. Global Insight 
16. HSBC MIDLAND 
17. Imperial Chemical Inds 
18. Industrial Bank of Japan 
19. ING Barings 
20. JP Morgan Chase 
21. Merrill Lynch 
22. Morgan Stanley 
23. NatWest Group 
24. Nomura Research Institute 
25. Oxford Economic Forecasting 
26. Royal Bank of Canada 
27. SBC Warburg 
28. Societe General 
29. Standard Chartered Bank 
30. UBS Warburg 
31. Westdeutsche Lbank 
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Tables and figures 
 
 
Table 1: Data 
 Euro  Yen 
 1 Month 3 Months 12 Months  1 Month 3 Months 12 Months 
     a) # Observations        
Min. # panelists / period 12 14 14  13 15 15 
Max. # panelists / period 24 24 24  24 24 24 
Median # panelists / period 19 20 20  19 20 20 
        
Min. # periods / panelist 3 12 12  3 12 12 
Max. # periods / panelist 143 144 144  143 144 144 
Median # periods / panelist 101 102 102  102 103 103 
        
Total # observations 2825 2932 2930  2835 2941 2940 
     b) Descriptive statistics         
Median -0.0036 -0.0118 -0.0397  -0.0030 -0.0060 -0.0343 
Maximum 0.1136 0.1366 0.2110  0.1985 0.3331 0.4512 
Minimum -0.1700 -0.2036 -0.2883  -0.1667 -0.1667 -0.3050 
Standard deviation 0.0246 0.0370 0.0686  0.0301 0.0473 0.0857 
Skewness -0.3430 -0.2080 0.0565  0.3216 0.3332 0.5532 
Kurtosis 5.7290 3.9952 2.8560  6.1241 4.7625 4.3544 
Autocorrelation (1st lag) 0.3900 0.5090 0.7550  0.4170 0.5710 0.7410 
Notes: Table presents the number of observations per period and per respondent (Panel a) as well as the 
descriptive statistics of the expected log-changes in the exchange rate, i.e. ,ln( ( )) ln( )i t t k tE e e+ −  over all 
panelists and periods (Panel b). 
 
 31 








Benchmark Static Dynamic 
 
Benchmark Static Dynamic 
 
Benchmark Static Dynamic 
 
Panel A: EURO 
cf -0.0005* -0.0024 0.0007 
 
-0.0070*** -0.0060*** 0.0038*** 
 
-0.0060*** -0.0055*** 0.0022** 
 
(-1.6896) (-0.8814) (1.4442) 
 
(-8.8630) (-5.8113) (6.2747) 
 
(-5.2846) (-5.6806) (2.3790) 
ß 0.0497 0.7571*** 0.7701*** 
 
0.8398*** 0.7658*** 0.5495*** 
 
0.2715*** 0.2574*** 0.1641*** 
 
(1.0463) (7.4665) (38.821) 
 
(35.804) (32.011) (35.095) 
 














kα  -0.2027*** -0.2860*** -0.4389*** 
 
-0.2548*** -0.4162*** -0.4295*** 
 
-0.4983*** -0.3356** -0.5884*** 
 
(-9.3149) (-16.999) (-26.886) 
 
(-8.9567) (-13.330) (-20.086) 
 
(-14.968) (-2.4209) (-17.436) 
            Adj. R2 -0.0395 0.1035 0.5469 
 
0.1571 0.1966 0.6322 
 











   
0.1711 
   
0.3036 
 
Panel B: YEN 
cf -0.0003 0.0037* -0.0019*** 
 
-0.0017** -0.0010 -0.0002 
 
-0.0065*** -0.0065*** -0.0004 
 
(-0.8836) (1.8707) (-3.5330) 
 
(-2.0742) (-0.8246) (-0.2466) 
 
(-4.9575) (-5.8260) (-0.3611) 
ß 0.0607 1.2845*** 1.2097*** 
 
0.8362*** 0.8012*** 0.6315*** 
 
0.3129*** 0.3032*** 0.2033*** 
 
(1.3734) (21.559) (61.071) 
 
(41.772) (35.656) (33.852) 
 














kα  -0.3648*** -0.3504*** -0.4231*** 
 
-0.5127*** -0.4867*** -0.7956*** 
 
-0.6970*** -0.6311*** -0.8137*** 
 
(-15.615) (-20.597) (-22.156) 
 
(-17.563) (-14.982) (-30.179) 
 
(-22.932) (-5.4470) (-21.582) 
            Adj. R2 0.1316 0.1713 0.6232 
 
0.3329 0.2530 0.6526 
 











   
0.1204 
   
0.2546 
Notes: Table presents estimation results for the Euro/US Dollar (Panel A) and Yen/US Dollar (Panel B) exchange rate. % fun is the percentage of 
fundamentalists; AC is the autocorrelation in the selected group. Newey-West standard errors are given in parentheses. *, **, and *** represents 
significance at the 10, 5, and 1% level, respectively. 
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Model: Fundamental Chart Bench 
 
Fundamental Chart Bench 
 
Fundamental Chart Bench 
 
Fundamental Chart Bench 
 
1 MONTH 
c -0.002 0.001 -0.001 
 
-0.001** -0.006** 0.000 
 
0.004* -0.012** 0.000 
 
0.001*** -0.002** 0.000 
 
(-1.458) (0.277) (-0.583) 
 
(-2.548) (-7.254) (-1.609) 
 
(1.840) (-2.521) (0.087) 
 

















































R2 -0.096 -0.012 0.141 
 
-0.305 0.105 -0.039 
 
0.173 0.116 0.407 
 
-0.228 0.164 0.080 
 
3 MONTHS 
c -0.006*** -0.012*** -0.006*** 
 
-0.008*** -0.015*** -0.008*** 
 
-0.001 -0.007** 0.000 
 
-0.003** -0.006*** -0.003** 
 
(-5.801) (-5.379) (-5.702) 
 
(-6.970) (-9.617) (-7.333) 
 
(-0.800) (-2.554) (-0.366) 
 

















































R2 0.275 0.053 0.297 
 
-0.033 0.114 0.022 
 
0.336 0.074 0.417 
 
0.029 0.149 0.233 
 
12 MONTHS 
c -0.006*** -0.039*** -0.006*** 
 
-0.010*** -0.013*** -0.010*** 
 
-0.007*** -0.030*** -0.006*** 
 
-0.024*** -0.049*** -0.023*** 
 
(-4.642) (-12.175) (-5.050) 
 
(-2.727) (-2.433) (-2.748) 
 
(-5.009) (-7.378) (-4.500) 
 

















































R2 0.636 0.070 0.683 
 
-0.197 0.046 -0.205 
 
0.634 0.060 0.709 
 
-0.148 0.111 -0.020 
Notes: Table presents results for the consistency estimations; i.e., we estimated the two models on the two separate subsamples in order to judge the selective power of the 
selection mechanism. R2 is adjusted R2; Newey-West standard errors in parenthesis; *, **, *** represents significance at the 10, 5, and 1% level, respectively. 
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Model: Fundamental Chart Bench 
 
Fundamental Chart Bench 
 
Fundamental Chart Bench 
 
Fundamental Chart Bench 
 
1 MONTH 
c 0.001 -0.004*** 0.001* 
 
-0.003*** -0.007*** -0.003*** 
 
-0.002*** -0.005** -0.002*** 
 
0.004*** -0.002*** 0.000 
 
(1.418) (-2.769) (1.926) 
 
(-4.224) (-15.234) (-4.576) 
 
(-3.553) (-2.647) (-3.893) 
 

















































R2 0.672 0.004 0.681 
 
-1.559 0.357 -0.764 
 
0.770 0.054 0.777 
 
-1.828 0.356 -0.775 
 
3 MONTHS 
c 0.004*** -0.004* 0.004*** 
 
-0.024*** -0.024*** -0.025*** 
 
0.000 -0.006** 0.000 
 
-0.005*** -0.009*** -0.007*** 
 
(6.281) (-1.833) (6.454) 
 
(-21.882) (-35.553) (-24.224) 
 
(-0.247) (-2.174) (0.147) 
 

















































R2 0.719 0.044 0.724 
 
-1.087 0.261 -0.858 
 
0.733 0.002 0.740 
 
-0.653 0.496 0.054 
 
12 MONTHS 
c 0.002** -0.026*** 0.002** 
 
-0.053*** -0.063*** -0.053*** 
 
0.000 -0.029*** 0.000 
 
-0.031*** -0.035*** -0.031*** 
 
(2.401) (-6.493) (2.329) 
 
(-19.619) (-50.595) (-20.591) 
 
(-0.366) (-5.667) (0.032) 
 

















































R2 0.836 0.057 0.853 
 
-0.755 0.260 -0.450 
 
0.845 0.024 0.871 
 
-0.543 0.352 0.011 
Notes: Table presents results for the consistency estimations; i.e., we estimated the two models on the two separate subsamples in order to judge the selective power of the 
selection mechanism. R2 is adjusted R2; Newey-West standard errors in parenthesis; *, **, *** represents significance at the 10, 5, and 1% level, respectively. 
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Table 5 Simulation Results 
  
Euro 




1 month 3 months 12 months 
 
1 month 3 months 12 months 
 
 R2 Switching Model - R2 Benchmark Model 
Observed 0.586 0.475 0.137 
 
0.492 0.320 0.104 
Simulation: 
       Max 0.181 0.358 0.146 
 
0.145 0.273 0.138 
3rd perc 0.154 0.310 0.113 
 
0.116 0.217 0.101 
2nd perc 0.147 0.292 0.105 
 
0.111 0.204 0.093 
1st perc 0.142 0.254 0.097 
 
0.106 0.193 0.085 
Min 0.123 0.197 0.069 
 
0.086 0.149 0.057 
Prob. <0.000 <0.000 0.050 
 
<0.000 <0.000 0.191 
 
Fundamental Sample: R2 Fundamental Model - R2 Chartist Model 
Observed 0.668 0.675 0.779 
 
0.716 0.730 0.821 
Simulation: 
       Max 0.687 0.610 0.845 
 
0.738 0.662 0.823 
3rd perc 0.663 0.563 0.829 
 
0.713 0.639 0.807 
2nd perc 0.653 0.461 0.824 
 
0.706 0.631 0.803 
1st perc 0.642 0.441 0.820 
 
0.698 0.622 0.798 
Min 0.528 0.381 0.799 
 
0.566 0.398 0.764 
Prob. 0.120 0.000 1.000 
 
0.160 0.000 0.050 
 
Chartist Sample: R2 Fundamental Model - R2 Chartist Model 
Observed -1.916 -1.347 -1.015 
 
-2.184 -1.149 -0.895 
Simulation: 
       Max -0.270 0.287 -0.453 
 
-0.434 0.164 -0.512 
3rd perc -0.691 0.175 -0.548 
 
-0.618 -0.643 -0.591 
2nd perc -0.735 0.131 -0.569 
 
-0.657 -0.659 -0.606 
1st perc -0.777 -0.638 -0.588 
 
-0.698 -0.678 -0.621 
Min -0.949 -0.757 -0.657 
 
-0.918 -0.739 -0.683 
Prob. <0.000 <0.000 <0.000 
 
<0.000 <0.000 <0.000 
Notes: This table presents the empirically observed differences in R2 from Tables 2 and 4 as well as the 
distribution of differences in R2 as generated by the simulations. Max represents the maximum; perc is 
percentile; Min is the minimum. Prob. is the percentage of simulations (out of 1,000 runs) for which we 
observe a larger change in R2 than empirically observed; this represents the probability that the static 
model is not the actual law of motion. 
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Table 6 Correlations between model choices 
 
 Euro  Yen 
 
 1 Month 3 Months 12 Months  1 Month 3 Months 12 Months 
 




1 Month 1.000       
        
3 Months 0.381*** 1.000      
 (20.529)       
12 Months 0.137*** 0.260*** 1.000     
 (6.870) (13.383)      
 




1 Month 0.050** 0.020 0.003  1.000   
 (2.494) (0.980) (0.163)     
3 Months 0.052** 0.044** 0.015  0.403*** 1.000  
 (2.604) (2.216) (0.768)  (21.94)   
12 Months 0.050** 0.053** 0.051**  0.134*** 0.256*** 1.000 
 (2.477) (2.637) (2.530)  (6.746) (13.21)  
 




1 Month 1.000       
        
3 Months 0.548*** 1.000      
 (7.843)       
12 Months 0.336*** 0.506*** 1.000     
 (4.260) (7.012)      
 




1 Month 0.030 -0.126 -0.057  1.000   
 (0.356) (-1.513) (-0.685)     
3 Months 0.087 -0.069 -0.105  0.500*** 1.000  
 (1.041) (-0.823) (-1.261)  (6.898)   
12 Months 0.029 -0.010 0.128  0.169** 0.425*** 1.000 
 (0.345) (-0.114) (1.543)  (2.056) (5.620)  




1 Month 1.000       
        
3 Months 0.514*** 1.000      
 (3.230)       
12 Months 0.693*** 0.489*** 1.000     
 (5.178) (3.021)      
 




1 Month 0.672*** 0.207 0.362**  1.000   
 (4.882) (1.142) (2.092)     
3 Months -0.047 -0.116 -0.263  0.256 1.000  
 (-0.251) (-0.627) (-1.466)  (1.427)   
12 Months 0.632*** 0.299* 0.291*  0.562*** 0.033 1.000 
 (4.393) (1.686) (1.637)  (3.657) (0.175)  
Notes: This table presents the correlations between the model choices of panelists for the six currency / 
horizon combinations. Panel A gives the pooled correlations; Panel B gives the within period correlations 
(using the 146 averages over individuals); Panel C gives the within individual correlations (using the 31 




Figure 1: Fundamental Exchange Rates 
Euro Japanese Yen 
  









96 97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 







96 97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 
e f  
 37 















































25 50 75 100 125
Yen 12 Months
 
Notes: Figure presents the cross-sectional average choice for the fundamental value over time, retrieved 
from the dynamic model.  
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Notes: Figure presents the time-series average choice for the fundamental value per panelist, retrieved 
from the dynamic model.  
 
